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Abstract
Contemporary ways of understanding of science, especially in the
philosophy of science, are beset by overly abstract and formal models
of evidence. In such models, the only interesting feature of evidence is
that it has a one-way “support” relation to hypotheses, theories, causal
claims, etc. These models create a variety of practical and philosophi-
cal problems, one prominent example being the experimenter’s regress.
According to the experimenter’s regress, good evidence is produced by
good techniques, but which techniques are good is only determined by
whether they produce the evidence we expect. The best answer to this
problem within the traditional approach relies on the concept of robust
evidence, but this answer ultimately falls flat because it creates impos-
sible requirements on good evidence. The problem can more easily be
solved by rejecting abstract, formalistic models of evidence in favor of
a model of inquiry which pays attention to the temporal complexity of
the process of inquiry and the distinction between observational and
experimental evidence.
1 Introduction
Several problems in the contemporary discussions of evidence only arise be-
cause of inattention to the complexity of the process of inquiry and the uses
of evidence. While inattention to these matters seems endemic amongst
philosophers, the problem has also come to infect certain of the social and
medical sciences as well as policy-making. The source of the problem is the
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use of idealized models of inquiry and evidence, in which evidence is charac-
terized by a formal relation of support it has to a hypothesis or theory. In
such models, evidence is useful for this one task, and the task can be char-
acterized without recourse to factors of the particular context or temporal
development of the inquiry in which evidence arises and is used.
This essay will show how a model of the temporal dynamics of inquiry
and the functional role of evidence better addresses the problem known as the
“experimenter’s regress,” popularized by H.M. Collins (1975, [1985] 1992).
According to this model, there are different kinds of evidence, playing dif-
ferent roles in an inquiry, and one major distinction is that between obser-
vational and experimental evidence. Along the way, I will argue that the
appeals to the robustness of evidence (e.g., Culp 1995) in attempt to solve
the experimenter’s regress are bound to fail, and that the value of robustness
itself is better understood according to the inquiry-model than by traditional
approaches.
2 Evidence and the Model of Inquiry
The temporal dynamics of inquiry have received scant attention in philoso-
phy of science. There are only two major models which develop the temporal
complexity of inquiry. One has been developed by Kuhn and his followers
and critics. Kuhn’s model discusses the career of large-scale theories or re-
search paradigms that govern entire areas over a large span of time. These
models are sufficiently large-scale and long-term that they are not useful for
addressing current concerns about the nature of evidence. Problems like
the experimenter’s regress deal not with the evolution of theories over the
long run, nor the revolutionary replacement of theories or paradigms. The
questions at issue are far more local.
The other major model of inquiry on offer is one introduced by C.S. Peirce
and articulated by John Dewey. This model works best at the more local
level of particular scientific inquiries, though it has some applications at the
larger scale. I will not discuss potential conflicts or compatibilities between
the two models, nor will I attempt a full defense of this model here,1 though
I will attempt to make it as plausible as possible and provide an illuminating
example.
1 I have done so elsewhere (Brown 2009, in preparation).
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In the main outlines, the pragmatist model of the dynamics of inquiry
goes has the following interlocking phases:
1. Inquiry Begins with a Felt Perplexity. There are many types of perplex-
ity, but they are not in general a mere state of ignorance on the part
of the inquirer. Rather, the state of the science, including theories and
techniques, is discoordinated or indeterminate, and this is reflected in the
feeling of perplexity on the part of the inquirer(s). There are conflicting
tendencies within the situation of the field at the present time, requiring
investigation. (Contrast this with the smooth application of a theory to
a situation with immediate success.)
2. The Institution of a Problem. The situation must be assessed in order
to formulate a problem-statement that adequately captures the felt per-
plexity. Operations of observation must take place in order to arrive at a
statement of the problem, which evolves as the inquiry develops.
3. The Determination of a Problem-Solution The first pass at observation
and problem-formulation suggest hypotheses for solving the problem. The
hypothesis is usually but not always generated from a larger field of back-
ground theory, which may require special development in the specific con-
text.
4. The Coordination of Observations and Hypotheses. A reciprocal pro-
cess of coordination and improvement of observed facts and theoretical-
hypothetical ideas is undertaken, in which hypotheses are developed or
eliminated, new more refined observations are made, and the problem-
statement is refined.
5. The Necessity of Experiment. A series of tentative, experimental appli-
cations of the hypotheses are made in order to estimate their efficacy as
problem-solutions. Earlier experiments can suggest more refined experi-
ments, or the necessity of further articulating data and hypothesis, or the
need to “go back to the drawing board.” Solving any problem requires
operations of making and doing. Ideas cannot be tested by a purely pas-
sive collection of facts through observation. Active interventions of an
experimental nature provide necessary evidence about the prospective ef-
fectiveness of solutions.
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6. Judgment. Inquiry continues until a hypothesis is adjudged to resolve the
problem, while the alternatives have been ruled out, and the conclusion
can be used as a reliable means to further inquiries.
This is obviously an idealized picture of the conduct of inquiry, but it is
informed by Peirce’s and Dewey’s participation in and studies of the actual
practice of science. It is a normative-explanatory model, attempting to cap-
ture and explain the lessons of successful inquiries past. It will be helpful to
use a concrete illustration to clarify this abstract model. Consider the work
of John Snow on the transmission of the disease cholera.2
3 Snow on Cholera
The basic outlines of the problematic situation are clear: cholera is a terrible
disease, fatal in nearly all cases in Snow’s time. It is tempting to say that
the problem itself is clear from the beginning: how is cholera communicated,
and how can its transmission be prevented or contained? While the idea
of contagious diseases was not new in the middle of the nineteenth century,
when Snow was at work on cholera, it was neither fully accepted nor clearly
distinguished from views identifying disease as a punishment for sin. To
regard some diseases as communicable, and to identify cholera in this way,
is already to be well on into the inquiry. Cholera tended to be concentrated
amongst the poor, and almost never infected the doctors who tended to the
sick. This was taken as evidence that the disease was “a just punishment for
the undeserving and vicious classes of society”(26). To regard the problem
as one fixed prior to inquiry would be to take as fixed from the beginning
many things that were at first unsettled.
Snow begins by collecting a variety of general facts, such as the beginnings
of the disease in India and the spread via human interaction (29). He then
moves to more specific cases (30–1). From the start, the evidence clearly sug-
gests that the disease is communicable. But it doesn’t fit well with the more
popular “effluvia” theory of transmission of disease through the air, since
spending time in the company of the sick doesn’t necessarily lead to infec-
tion (31). Rather, a particular pattern of behavior (tending to the patient in
2 My discussion here is taken from Goldstein and Goldstein (1978, pp. 25–62) who
draw heavily on Snow’s own manuscripts. Parenthetical references are to their discussion.
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intimate fashion) and pathology (beginning with intestinal symptoms) sug-
gest another hypothesis: The disease spreads by some infected matter from
a cholera patient being accidently ingested in sufficient quantity (33).
This hypothesis suggests some further observations. If it is valid, you’ll
find that certain people who come near to the patient do not get cholera
(as we’ve seen), and that they avoided it by way of habits of cleanliness
that would prevent them from accidently ingesting any choleraic evacuations.
Indeed, this is clearly the case with doctors, who do not generally contract
cholera from their patients (33). Reasoning through the implications of the
hypothesis, we can see that there are several reasons that people of different
social classes would have different levels of risk of contracting the disease
based on differnt living conditions and behavior around the sick (33–34).
One observation raises a puzzle, however. Cholera does sometimes spread
to the rich despite the absence of the vectors of direct communication present
in the case of the poor. Snow did not take this to invalidate the hypothesis,
however. Rather, he supposed a further specification of the hypothesis in
these cases that would provide the appropriate kind of transmission vector:
cholera can spread through the water supply (35). Further cases support this
hypothesis.
Having worked out the implications of the hypothesis and found corre-
sponding facts is not where Snow stopped. The next phase requires exper-
imental application of the hypothesis to real situations in order to test its
adequacy. Experimental application is not just a special way of generating
further observations. Certainly, techniques of observation are part of the
experiment, but the function is nonetheless very different. The functions of
observation are to fix the conditions of the problematic situation and the
terms of the problem, as well as to suggest and refine hypotheses. The func-
tion on an experiment is to put the hypothesis into practice, in a limited and
controlled fashion, in order to determine its efficacy in solving the problem.
Snow engaged in at least two experiments, neither of which is entirely
satisfactory from the point of view of our model, though the details here are
not so important to the main point. The final part of Snow’s monograph
on cholera is the most crucial, from the point of view of our model. In
the last section, Snow provides a list of twelve recommendations for how to
prevent the spread of cholera, based on his two hypotheses, plus some further
reasoning about possible cases. For example:
1st. The strictest cleanliness should be observed by those about
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the sick. . .
3rd. Care should be taken that the water employed for drinking
and preparing food. . . is not contaminated with the contents of
cesspools, house-drains, or sewers. . .
11th. To inculcate habits of personal and domestic cleanliness
among the people everywhere. . .
Such recommendations are crucial to the eventual acceptance of Snow’s
explanation. No amount of convincing argument provided by a scientific
manuscript can be the ultimate measure of a scientific judgment’s warranted
assertibility. What matters is that others take the results to be so settled as
to provide a steady resource for further inquiry and that future applications,
such as the ones suggested by Snow in this final section, are successful; these
are the “decisive experiments” in favor of Snow’s view.
4 The Experimenter’s Regress
Many people regard the impact of theory on evidence as having problematic
consequences. For example, Robert Hudson (2000) believes that if we cannot
make room in our epistemology for direct perception, unmediated by theory
or concepts, then we can never escape the “hermeneutic circle” and find some
independent ground for our knowledge-claims unsullied by the question at
issue. Sylvia Culp (1995), in a similar vein, worries about and attempts
to solve the problem of the “experimenter’s regress” raised by H.M. Collins
(1975, [1985] 1992). According to Collins, good data is regarded as the
product of a good experimental technique, but the test of an experimental
technique is just whether it produces the expected data. The same worry can
be put about the need to interpret “raw data” before it can become “data”
or “facts” (Culp 1995, p. 439).
Something like the following picture, suggested by Culp, is surely right:
what happens in the lab prior to interpretation is merely a brute happening,
and brute happenings are not themselves evidence. We must then interpret
those happenings, take them up as a certain item of fact, and, metaphorically
speaking, teach them to speak the language of the theory, in order to see how
they bear on the theory. This interpretation is never independent of theory,
neither the theory of how the apparatus works nor the theory in question. All
of this presents a problem, according to Collins and Culp, because we are left
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wondering how interpretations of experiments that themselves presuppose
controversial theories, including parts of the theory in question, can serve as
solid ground to support those theories.
From the point of view of the inquiry-model, several crucial parts of the
story have been left out. For one, it mentions only one direction on the two-
way street of the coordination of factual and conceptual materials. Contra
Culp’s supposition, we don’t only teach evidence to “speak the language” of
theory. We also teach the theory to speak language of observation; that is,
we must develop our hypotheses so that they have operational consequences,
that they may direct activities of observation and so that experiments may
be created that apply the hypothesis as a solution to the problem. Collins’
and Culp’s shared way of setting up the problem presupposes that theory
is inert, and experiment must be constructed or interpreted in a way that
meets it. But theory and experiment must meet in the middle.
Further, both parties to the debate construe the function of evidence
extremely narrowly, collapsing the distinction between observational and ex-
perimental evidence. Evidence is taken to be exhausted by its function of
supporting a theory, but this is a relatively minor function of evidence within
the course of inquiry. Observation serves to help fix the problem, it suggests
hypotheses for solution, helps improve hypotheses. Experiments put hy-
potheses to work in tentative application, trying them out as solutions to a
problem. It is undeniable that in some sense, theories “produce” their own
evidence, but this is only a problem if evidence only serves to justify theory,
and theory is only justified by that body of evidence it produces. To the con-
trary, producing (not predicting) some events is the point of a theory; it is
the adequacy of the consequences produced to solving the problem at hand,
along with its usefulness in attacking new problems and supplementing new
inquiries that are the ultimate test of the theory.
A key to the problem of the experimenter’s regress is the issue of calibra-
tion.3 Early attempts to detect or measure some previously unobserved or
unquantified phenomenon are faced with a problem of how to calibrate the
technique, lacking any other techniques to check against. We have only theo-
retical expectations about what the phenomenon should be like to guide us.4
Later attempts are faced with the problem that their calibration depends on
3 See section I.B.1 of Franklin 2007.
4 Hasok Chang’s work on temperature (2004) explicitly addresses the way that basic
expectations guide this process.
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previous measurements which themselves were not calibrated in a standard
way. In both cases there is a troublesome regress; in the later case, the circle
of data and technique is simply pushed back to earlier stages.
But the question we should ask is, “What is this experimental evidence
for?” Under the impoverished model of theory-evidence relationships that
regards the sole role for evidence to be either adding or removing support
from a hypothesis (in context-free fashion), the experimenter’s regress is a
serious concern. If evidence lacks independent plausibility, it cannot stand
as support in the way this simple model would hope. Godin and Gingras
(2002) have suggested that the “experimenter’s regress” amounts to just the
classical problems of skepticism, and thus that we should get around it in
the same way that we get around skeptical worries in epistemology generally.
This answer will not do, however, as the problem is internal to the traditional
model, once the facts of theory-dependence in evidence are accepted. One
must either elaborate or replace this model to avoid them.
Sylvia Culp’s (1995) alternative solution to the problem posed by the ex-
perimenter’s regress is to appeal to the robustness of evidence. We need not
have full independence of evidence from our expectations. Rather, what we
need is evidence from a variety of different kinds of sources that are indepen-
dent from each other, whose interpretation relies on the theory in question
in quite different ways (if at all), and that all support the same conclusion.
Evidence from a single source that seems to support the conclusion but only
does so due to being calibrated that way would be problematically circular.
A variety of different types of evidence, developed independently from each
other, which all seem to support the conclusion but in fact are just the prod-
uct of our expectations, so the argument goes, would be a miracle. A far
better explanation is just the truth of the hypothesis.
The strategy is an appealing one. While no single thread can do the job,
a rope woven in the right way can be strong enough. In Culp’s argument,
she fully admits that no particular bit of evidence can be theory-free, that
it doesn’t even make sense to talk of uninterpreted, bare “happenings” as
evidence. Nonetheless, since she is committed to the metaphor of support,
she attempts to find an arrangement of evidence that can be strong support
our hypotheses. According to her argument, a set of evidence can be a
foundation for theoretical knowledge if it is robust—if it comes from a variety
of sources that are theoretically independent of each other.
This argument fails to meet the challenge posed by the experimenter’s
regress, however. At least three difficulties arise, one empirical and two epis-
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temological.5 The first is the difficulty of finding really independent sources
of evidence. The history of the development of experimental techniques is
replete with a variety of cross-calibration techniques. Chang’s (2004) discus-
sion of the development of the modern thermometer shows the complex in-
terdependencies of various new techniques for measuring temperature. Early
errors propagate into later techniques and take a long time to disappear
entirely, as in the case of measurements of the charge of the electron (Feyn-
man [1974] 1999), because of the preponderance of cross-calibration. True
independence may be difficult to determine.
The second problem, which springs off from the first, is that robustness
doesn’t really solve the problem of calibration. For any particular measure-
ment technique, there are two cases: either it is calibrated according to
existing techniques, or it isn’t. In the former case, the possibility of inde-
pendent techniques of measurement is seriously endangered. Furthermore,
the question of how those pre-existing techniques were themselves calibrated
must be examined. In the latter case, it would appear that all we have to go
on to judge the results provided by the technique is the very expectations we
hope to support. A variety of different types of evidence, all calibrated by
reference to the same set of expectations also lack the independence required
by the argument.
On the other hand, it may be that the different types of measurement,
though originally calibrated in a suspect way, are calibrated with respect
to different, independent sets of expectations.6 While problematic in those
original circumstances, in a present case, they may be sufficiently indepen-
dent from one another to provide robust, adequate evidence in the case at
hand. Even supposing that this case passes the empirical test of independence
discussed above, a larger question about whether we ought to rely on the ev-
idence remains. Perhaps we ought to regard it as a miracle that a variety of
such evidence purportedly supports a single conclusion, but why should we
think that the truth of that conclusion explains the apparent miracle, given
the story of evidence now on offer? A variety of methods, calibrated under
highly suspicious circumstances, apparently providing no real support in the
case of their original development, now all happen to agree on one conclu-
sion. Do we have any reason to believe that this coincidence has anything
5 Compare to Jacob Stegenga’s “three easy problems” for robustness (unpublished).
The first (empirical) problem is especially close to Stegenga’s discussion.
6 Though this seems unlikely in the light of Chang’s discussion of the underlying ex-
pectations that inform the development of measurement techniques.
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to do with the truth of the conclusion? Not without some prior reason to
think that the methods, taken individually, track the truth in even a mod-
estly reliable fashion. But it is precisely the lack of such a reason in the case
of individual techniques that leads to the demand for robustness in the first
place.
A final problem arises for the attempt to solve this problem through the
appeal to robustness. As mentioned before, in order to have truly indepen-
dent sources of evidence, it is crucial that the the measurement techniques
not be calibrated to one another, lest the bias in one creep in to the other.
The sources must be multi-modal, and they must be incommensurable, in the
sense of not having any inter-modal standard of comparison (otherwise, they
are probably calibrated to one another). If they are incommensurable in this
way, however, we’re left with a major worry: if we have no standard of com-
parison between the types of evidence, how can we say determinately that
they support the same conclusion? If the interpretive framework at hand is
the theory in question, of course, then it is easy to see how different pieces of
evidence support the same conclusion. But if all the evidence can be inter-
preted by the theory in such a way as to allow cross-modal comparisons, it
isn’t really independent in the way that Culp demands. Suppose, then, that
the sources of evidence are all independent from one another in the strong
sense. How do you determine the relevance of each to your hypothesis?7
Evidence that meets the requirements of robustness, understood in the way
it must be in order to solve the problem at hand, may be sufficiently incon-
gruous that it would be difficult to make even qualitative comparisons. And
in the common case where there is some discordance between different types
of evidence, the necessary lack of an inter-modal standard of comparison
prevents us from knowing how to resolve the conflict.8
The inquiry-model of evidence provides a very different answer to the
question of the purpose of evidence. Evidence has a variety of functional roles
within an inquiry, the main goal of which is the resolution of the perplexity
which spurred the inquiry. In general, then, the experimenter’s regress will
not present any difficulty, since what matters is that the evidence fulfill its
role well enough for the purposes of solving whatever problem presents itself.
So long as we find a way to combat the disease and increase the life and
7 The problem of relevance is raised by Nancy Cartwright in her discussions of evidence-
based policy (2009) and discussed by Stegenga (unpublished).
8 The terms “incongruity” and “discordance” and the associated problems are raised
in the context of robustness by Stegenga (unpublished).
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vitality of people, it doesn’t matter than the experimental techniques have a
variety of dependencies on the experimenter’s expectations. Since experiment
is not merely a procedure for producing neutral evidence, but rather a way of
making and doing that puts the hypothesis into practice, there is a test of the
experimental evidence, together with the hypothesis, that is independent of
expectations per se. Expectation cannot prevent a bridge from falling down,
nor can it cure disease, nor can it even make quantum mechanics compatible
with general relativity.
5 The Value of Robustness
In attempting to respond to the experimenter’s regress and related problems,
the defenders of the value of robustness have created an insoluble dilemma.
Robustness must on such accounts achieve independence from foreground
expectations and background theory by being so independent from each other
that the potentially infecting theories, assumptions, and expectations “cancel
out,” that it would be a “miracle” if such diverse techniques all point to the
same conclusion. But in order to achieve independence, the members of
the set of evidence must end up being mutually incommensurable, because
commensurability requires the shared background and mutual calibration
that endangers the needed independence. However, the incommensurability
of evidence brings with it the problems of incongruity and discordance, which
threaten the very possibility of determining how the evidence bears on a
hypothesis.
Not only is robustness unnecessary to solve the problem of the exper-
imenter’s regress, which disappears when we move from an impoverished
model of evidence to the inquiry-model, but “robustness” as we’ve been
forced to defined it is actually an impossible requirement. If evidence cannot
be integrated, then inquiry cannot move towards resolution. As a result, it
may seem that robustness has no place as a scientific norm. This is an un-
acceptable conclusion, given the apparent obviousness of its epistemic value
and its unanimous support amongst scientists. But it isn’t the value of ro-
bustness per se that has been challenged in this chapter. Rather, it is the
particular way of understanding robustness that Culp and others are forced
into. Robustness, as it figures in the methodological platitudes which the
defenders of robustness cite, is merely the recommendation to seek evidence
of several type from different sources. The further requirement of complete
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independence is forced by the purposes that Culp puts robustness to. If we
relax these impossible restrictions on robust evidence, the value of robustness
becomes more clear. A set of evidence that includes many different kinds of
physical processes, and one that does not depend on controversial hypothesis
that are unnecessary to the hypothesis in question or the materials need to
integrate the evidence has the obvious value that we would expect. When
robustness is not asked to do an impossible job, it is no longer plagued by
irresolvable difficulties.
6 Conclusion
In closing, I would like to emphasize the variety of roles that evidence plays
in the course of an inquiry. In many accounts, evidence is mono-functional:
all evidence serves as a test of a theory/hypothesis, and it confirms or dis-
confirms, and there is no interesting difference between evidence garnered by
observation versus that gotten by experimentation. In the model of inquiry
I’ve been discussing, however, evidence serves many purposes. Observational
evidence helps locate the problem; it provides information about fixed con-
ditions; it guides speculation and hypothesis-formation; it helps us eliminate
or improve our original hypotheses. Experimental evidence also serves as
a tentative application of a developed hypothesis to check its consequences
for future action and inference. In every case, it is not some abstract or
formal relation between the evidence and the hypothesis by which the evi-
dence serves to justify the hypothesis. It is rather a very concrete process of
transforming a perplexity into a resolution that evidence serves, and which
ultimately justifies any final judgment of the inquiry. The formal or sym-
bolic features of evidence are only one small part. This complex, contextual,
and pluralistic model of the role of evidence in inquiry can serve to resolve a
variety of problems, as we’ve seen in the case of the experimenter’s regress.
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